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would appear to be no basis for an estoppel by judgment here. However, since the
confirmation proceedings determined that the arbitration had been regular, the court
could have held that the affirmation decree was res judicata on that issue. The court
could also have held that the arbitration award itself, although not entitled to the
force of res judicata, resembled an estoppel by judgment on the patent infringement
issue.'3 As the basis for this estoppel is the arbitration pursuant to the agreement to
arbitrate, the court was justified in stating that the estoppel could alternatively be
termed an estoppel by contract.'4 An unperformed arbitration contract cannot work an
estoppel in the federal courts which refuse to enforce such contracts specifically and
deny motions to stay trial on the issues which the parties had agreed to arbitrate except
in cases covered by the federal arbitration statute.' s Perhaps to avoid the pitfalls indicated in the present case the bar to future litigation on the patent infringement issue
should be termed "estoppel by arbitration."

Bankruptcy-Administration of Estates-Personal Representative as Petitioner in
Bankruptcy under Frazier-Lemke Act-[Utah].-Proceedings were instituted by a
farmer in a United States district court under Section 75, of the National Bankruptcy
Act and were pending when the farmer died. Thereafter, and without permission of
the bankruptcy court, a bank proceeded in a state court to foreclose its mortgage on
the decedent's farm and purchased the farm at the foreclosure sale. Immediately before the redemption period expired, the administrator of the decedent's estate obtained
an order of the probate court giving him permission to apply to the bankruptcy court
Dinerstein v. Shapiro, 147 Misc. 37, 262 N.Y.Supp. 461 (S. Ct. 1933); Cromwell v.
Countyof Sac, 9 4U.S. 351 (1876); 2 Black, Judgments §§ 526, 688 (2d ed. 1902); Sturges, op.
cit. supra note 6, §§ 479-80 (i93o ); cf. James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. v. Hedger Transportation Corp., 98 F. (2d) 55 (C.C.A. 2d x938); Brazil v. Isham and Earle, 12 N.Y. 9, 15 (1854); 26
Va. L. Rev. 327 (1940).
14 The contract to submit infringement controversies to arbitration has been fulfilled and is
hence binding upon the parties and should estop them from further litigation upon the same
subject matter. As to subsequent infringements see American Specialty Stamping Co. v. New
England Enameling Co., 178 Fed. io6 (C. C. N.Y. igo).
is The Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1924), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ i-is (1927), provides for
both specific enforcement of a contract to arbitrate (§4) and stay of trial(§ 3). But the jurisdiction of the federal courts in arbitration proceedings is limited to commerce and maritime questions. Hence agreements to arbitrate patent disputes are not within their jurisdiction unless diversity of citizenship or over $3,ooo is involved, 36 Stat. io9i (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. §41 (1927).
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Shanferoke Coal and Supply Corp. v. WestchesterService Corp., 7o F. (2d) 297 (C.C.A. 2d 1934),
aff'd 293 U.S. 449 (193 5); Red Cross Lines v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924), discussed
in Sturges, op. cit. supra note 6,at §479; In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F. Supp. 992 (Pa. 1935);
Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F. (2d) 184 (D. C. Del. r93o); cf. Childs v. Tuttle, 54 Hun
(N.Y.) 57, 7 N.Y. Supp. 59, 227 (1889); 5o Harv. L. Rev. 364 (1936).

Xi U.S.C.A. § 203 (1939). This section is popularly known as the Frazier-Lemke Act
although strictly the name applies only to Subsection 75(s), ii U.S.C.A. § 203(S) (i939),
under which a farmer may obtain moratorium relief as contrasted with relief through extension or composition of his debts. See, in general, Letzler, Bankruptcy Reorganizations for
Farmers, 40 Col. L. Rev. 1133 (i94o); Gilbert's Collier, Bankruptcy 1368-96 (Moore & Levi
ed. i937); 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 539 (1941).
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under Section 75(r)2 for a revival and reinstatement of the debtor-relief proceedings.
On appeal by the bank from the order of the probate court, held, that General Order
in Bankruptcy 50(9)3 requires an administrator's petition under Section 75(r) to be
authorized by the probate court, and that the probate code does not give the probate
court power to "divest itself of jurisdiction" by authorizing the administrator to subject himself and the decedent's estate to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Order of probate court reversed and set aside. In re Harris'Estate.4
The court in the principal case assumed that the bankruptcy proceedings initiated
by the deceased farmer abated upon death.s Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act, 6 however, expressly provides that proceedings shall not abate on the death of the bankrupt.
There would seem to be no reason why Section 8 should not apply to proceedings under
Section 75. Section 75(n)7 provides, in effect, that all the general bankruptcy sections
of the Bankruptcy Act shall apply to proceedings under Section 75, "except as otherwise provided." Section 75 does not make any express provision on the subject of
abatement, and it contains nothing inconsistent with the application of Section 8 to
a proceeding under Section 75. On the contrary, Section 75(r) declares that the personal representative of a deceased farmer is a "farmer" for the purposes of Section 75,
i.e., it contemplates the initiation of farmer-relief proceedings by the personal representative of a deceased farmer, a decidedly more extreme result than the non-abatement of farmer-relief proceedings upon the death of the petitioner. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that Section 8 applies to proceedings under Section 75, and, therefore, that the debtor's proceedings under Section 75 did not abate on the debtor's
death.
If the bankruptcy proceedings in the principal case did not abate on the farmer's
death, the foreclosure proceedings in the state court came squarely within Section
75(o),8 which provides that such proceedings shall not be instituted or maintained
against the farmer's property without permission of the bankruptcy court. Therefore
the foreclosure, as was held in Kalb v. Feuerstein,9 should be regarded as ineffective
and subject to collateral attack. The bankruptcy court could have fulfilled the purposes of the pending bankruptcy proceeding by appointing a trustee to administer
the property of the deceased farmer-debtor even if the personal representative of the
deceased farmer failed to appear.' 0 The bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, could,
2

54 Stat. 40 (i94o), II U.S.C.A. § 203(r) (Supp. I94O).

ii U.S.C.A. following § 53 (Supp. I94O), promulgated by the Supreme Court to regulate
procedure under § 75, provides in part that the personal representative in order to "effect"
debtor relief under §75 shall procure "an order of the probate court authorizing him to file the
petition."
4 1o5 P. (2d) 461 (Utah i94o), cert. granted 85 S. Ct. 492 (1941).
s Ibid.
652 Stat. 848 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 26 (Supp. i94o).
7 ii
U.S.C.A. § 2o3(n) (1939) provides that on the filing of the farmer's petition, "the
jurisdiction and powers of the courts, the title, powers and duties of its officers," and the legal
relations of farmer, creditors and other persons with respect to the farmer's property, shall be
the same as if "a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed and a decree of adjudication had been entered" on the day the farmer's petition was filed.
3

8 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(0) (i939).

9 3o8 U.S. 433 (i94o); cf. Union Joint Stock Land Bank v. Byerly, 3io U.S. i (i94o).
"0Cf. In re Morgan, 15 F. Supp. 52 (N.Y. 1936).
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without reference to the definition of "farmer" contained in Section 75(r), permit the
personal representative to intervene as a necessary or proper party, in order to carry
the proceedings before it to completion. It would seem, therefore, that General Order
50(9)," requiring the consent of the probate court to participation of the personal
representative in farmer-relief proceedings, should be construed as inapplicable where
proceedings were instituted by a deceased farmer during his life, however applicable
General Order 50(9) may be where a personal representative petitions to initiate proceedings in behalf of the deceased farmer's estate.12 And even if the general order does
apply where the personal representative seeks to participate in a pending farmer-relief
proceeding, the probate court should not refuse the petition, since participation offers
the probate court its only opportunity to protect the various interests in the estate
'
which might be affected by the outcome of the farmer-relief proceeding.
The court in the principal case, however, treated the administrator's petition as a
request for permission of the probate court to file a petition under Section 75(r) to initiate proceedings under Section 75 in behalf of the deceased farmer's estate. 3 Assuming
that such were the case, Section 75(r) may be interpreted in two ways: (a) it may be
construed as allowing the filing of petitions by those personal representatives who are
authorized by state law to file the petition and to perform the duties required of a
farmer-debtor under Section 75; or (b) it may be construed to qualify as a petitioner
under Section 75 anyone whom the federal courts will recognize for this purpose as a
"personal representative" duly appointed by a state court. The lower federal courts
seem to have adopted interpretation (a). In lit re Buxton's .Estate,14 the administrator
of a deceased farmer filed an original petition under Section 75 in behalf of the decedent's estate. The petition was approved by the bankruptcy court, but the administrator's proposal for a composition and extension of the decedent's debts was unacceptable to creditors, and the administrator presented his petition to be adjudicated a
bankrupt in his representative capacity under Section 75(s).15 The court granted the
creditors' motion to dismiss the proceedings, on the ground that the proposal was too
indefinite to be valid, and, furthermore, that the administrator, who under state law
had neither title to nor right to possession of the decedent's real property, could not
lawfully be permitted to retain possession of, to manage, and to pay a reasonable rental
for the decedent's farm for three years under the Frazier-Lemke Act. The court said
that it was not the purpose of Congress "to add to or remove limits from the power and
authority conferred by a state statute upon a personal representative created solely by
" Note 3 supra.
X2Subdivisions (9)
and (io) of General Order So, ir U.S.C.A. following § 53 (Supp. r94o),
which provide in part that the personal representative shall attach to his petition, in lien of
schedules, an inventory of the decedent's property, and shall convince the bankruptcy court
that the decedent was a farmer within the meaning of § 75(r), and that the probate court shall
certify to the bankruptcy court the claims allowed in the probate court prior to the filing of the
petition, would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court was providing for an original petition
of the personal representative.
13 "Certainlyif a personal representative has power to initiate he has power to revive and, if
it requires an order of the probate court to permit him to initiate, it would also require an order
to revive." 1o P. (2d) 461, 468 (Utah i94o).
'4 14 F. Supp. 616 (Ill. I936).
ISNote i supra.
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7
virtue of such statute.' 6 In Hines v. Farkas,1
on the other hand, a temporary administrator was empowered by state law to carry on the business of the deceased and
was invested with possession of the realty for that purpose. Emphasizing these factors,
the bankruptcy court held that the temporary administrator of a deceased farmer was
a "personal representative" within the meaning of Section 75 and hence was authorx8
ized to file a petition thereunder.
In a concurring opinion in the principal case, one judge suggested the propriety of
interpretation (b) of Section 75(r). Section 75, as an exercise of the bankruptcy power,
he argued, is "paramount" to state law, even in the face of a state statute expressly
forbidding the petition in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy statute declares who may file
petitions under it, and if it authorizes a petition by a personal representative, the limits
on his powers under the probate laws have no bearing on his qualification to file the
bankruptcy petition.'9 The difference in point of view between the lower federal courts
and the concurring judge in the principal case finds a parallel in Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. 4x36 Wilcox Bldg. Corp.2 0 There, a corporation organized under Illinois laws
had been dissolved for failure to pay franchise taxes and to file annual reports. An
Illinois statute gave the corporation two years in which to collect debts due it, to sell
its property, and to prosecute and defend suits in its corporate name. No proceedings
could be initiated in behalf of the corporation after the two-year period, but pending
proceedings could be prosecuted to completion. After the two-year period had expired, certain persons acquired the stock of the corporation, held stockholders' and
directors' meetings, and passed a resolution authorizing the filing of a petition for reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. The petition was filed, together with a petition for an order directing the receiver in pending state court foreclosure proceedings to turn over the property to the federal court. The Supreme Court
held that the petitions should be dismissed. The Court argued, in effect, that the power
of an otherwise qualified corporation to file a petition under the Bankruptcy Act depends on its authority, under state law, to initiate court actions; 2 that the dissolved
corporation lacked power, under state law, to initiate any court proceeding; therefore,
that under the Illinois statute, the two-year period having expired, the officers lacked
power to file the petition for reorganization in behalf of the corporation.- Three judges
dissented, however, on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act declares that any corporation, with certain exceptions, may become a voluntary bankrupt; the Bankruptcy
x6 14 F. Supp. 6W6, 618 (Ill. 1936). This reasoning was adopted in In re Reynolds, 21 F.
Supp. 369, 371 (Okla. 1937), although the court there assigned as an independent ground for
its decision that the administrator's petition must be dismissed, the fact that the authorization
of the probate court had not been obtained.
'7 iog F. (2d) 289 (C.C.A. Sth i94o).
is The court said that the question whether § 75(r) enlarges the powers of the administrator
did not, therefore, have to be decided. Ibid., at 290.
'9 1o 5 P. (2d) 461, 464 (Utah i94o). Cf. the statement of the court in In re Prudence Co.,
Inc., 79 F. (2d) 77, 8o (C.C.A. 2d 1935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 646 (1935): "A declaration by a
state that a certain class of corporations is not amenable to bankruptcy is brutum fulmen,
unless the Bankruptcy Act itself excepts that class."
20 302 U.S. 120 (i937).

2

Cf. Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co.,
(1937).

22 302 U.S. 120, 126

289

U.S. 165, 171

(1933).
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Act defines "corporations" to mean "all bodies having any of the powers and privileges
of private corporations not possessed by individuals and partnerships"; the dissolved
corporation still possessed and exercised certain corporate powers, i.e., a power to defend, in its corporate name and through its corporate officials, suits then pending
either in its favor or against it; and therefore, that the "dissolved" corporation was a
corporation within the definition of the Bankruptcy Act.23
Applying the argument of the minority in the Wilcox case to the problem of construing Section 75(r), the simple conclusion would seem to be that of interpretation
(b)-that anyone whom the federal courts will accept as the "personal representative" of a "farmer" is a qualified petitioner under Section 75. Thus, the bankruptcy
court would examine whether the petitioning administrator or executor had the letters
of administration or letters testamentary necessary to make him a personal representative.24 Whether, under state law, the "personal representative" has the express power
to file a bankruptcy petition or to handle the administration of the decedent's real
property, as interpretation (a) requires, does not appear to be necessarily relevant.
Once bankruptcy jurisdiction has attached,2s the farmer in possession 26 (or his
personal representative) becomes an officer of the bankruptcy court; a personal representative in such a position is acting as agent of the bankruptcy court, and not of the
probate court which designated him administrator or executor. If, for any reason, the
"farmer" (including a personal representative) in possession cannot do what is required
of him by the bankruptcy statutes, the court may appoint a trustee or receiver to act
for him.27
For reasons similar to those underlying the criticism of interpretation (a) of Section 75(r), the construction in the instant case of General Order 50(9)28 seems doubtful. The court rested its decision on the ground that General Order 50(g) requires an
administrator's original petition under Section 75(r) to be authorized by the probate
court, and that the probate code of Utah, as the sole source of authority for the probate
court, contained no provision empowering the court to "divest itself of jurisdiction"
of the deceased farmer's estate by authorizing the filing of the petition by the administrator.29 Since by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act, the proceedings in the probate court
23Ibid., at 13o, 131.
Thus in Bacon, Receiver v. Federal Land Bank, io9 F.(2d) 285, 288 (C.C.A. 5 th 1940),
the court held that a receiver appointed by a state court was not a personal representative of
the decedent authorized to seek relief under §75(r).
A variant of interpretation (b) would explain the Buxton and Hines cases as taking the
view that "personal representative" in § 75(r) should be construed by the federal courts as
referring only to personal representatives with powers over real estate (under state law) suitable to their task as "farmers." This view would make the probate court's consent unnecessary, but would limit the class of personal representatives capable of filing petitions under
§ 75. It is worth noting that neither the Buxton nor the Hines cases deals with the consent of
the probate court.
2SSection 75(n), r i U.S.C.A. § 203(n) (1939), provides that the filing of the farmer's petition
shaH immediately subject the farmer and all his property to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court.
26Section 75(s), ii U.S.C.A. § 203(S) (i939), provides that the debtor shall remain in or be
restored to possession of the property subject to the supervision and control of the court.
27Note 7 supra.
28 Note 3 supra.
29 105 P. (2d) 461, 464 (Utah 1940).
'4
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are superseded by the bankruptcy proceedings when a petition under Section 75 is approved by the bankruptcy court,30 it is immaterial that the probate court lacks power
under the probate code to divest itself of jurisdiction. If General Order 5o(9), making
the consent of the probate court a condition precedent to the filing of a petition under
Section 75, is construed to permit the probate court to refuse the administrator the
necessary authorization on the ground that it lacks power under state law to divest
itself of jurisdiction, the general order would then require a result hitherto regarded
as anomolous or improper,3' and would certainly exceed any clear requirement of
Section 75 itself. If thus construed, the general order might well be held ineffective,
as being beyond the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Section 53 of the Bankruptcy Act.32 It is possible, however, to construe General Order 50(9) consistently with
Section 75(r), so as to give it effect as an attempt to promote harmonious relations between federal and state courts. It may be interpreted as recognizing that the probate
court has a limited discretion in refusing to authorize personal representatives to file
petitions under Section 75. The discretion thus acknowledged, however, should be
confined to serious issues of state probate policy. The requirement of the probate
court's authorization is a desirable safeguard against violation of the terms of the decedent's will (since the petition is a voluntary one in behalf of the decedent's estate), or
of some strong state policy or positive state law on matters of local concern. But the
general policy of probate proceedings to wind up decedents' affairs as quickly as possible33 should not be sufficient to prevent a petition by the administrator under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Under the majority view in the Wilcox case, it would seem that an administrator's
original petition under Section 75(r) should be allowed by the bankruptcy court, perhaps even without the consent of the probate court. In the Wilcox case, the petitioner
lacked any power to sue, whereas an administrator has abundant authority to sue on
behalf of the decedent's estate. But this factual distinction may not be sufficient, since
the majority in the Wilcox case depended on the principle of Hopkins FederalSavings &
Loan Ass'n v. Cleary.34 In that case, an act of Congress provided that any state member of a Federal Home Loan Bank could convert itself into a Federal Savings and Loan
Association by a vote of a majority of its stockholders. The statute contained no provision that conversion was not to be permitted in contravention of state laws, and the
Supreme Court found that Congress did not intend that the statute should be subject
to such a condition. The statute was declared to be an unconstitutional encroachment
on the reserved powers of the states and conversion from state into federal associations
was held to be of no effect when voted against the protest of the state.3s Building and
loan associations, it was argued, are peculiarly within the regulatory powers of the
state, and to interfere with the state's control over them was an interference with the
6
state's public policy.3
Thus it may be argued that if construed as permitting a personal representative to
file a petition under Section 75 without the consent of the probate court, Section 75(r)
30 Note

25

supra.

3x Section 75(n), ii U.S.C.A. § 203(n) (i939); note

25

supra.

32 Cf. Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426, 434 (1925).
33 On the statutory power of administrators and the authority of courts with respect to
carrying on the business of decedents, see 40 L.RA. (N.S.) 209-Il (1912).
34 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
31Ibid., at 335, 343.
36 Ibid., at 336, 337.
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violates the Tenth Amendment, by interfering with the peculiarly local matter of
probate administration under state law. Although the Constitution does not deny to
the Federal Government power to administer the estates of decedent bankrupts and
although such administration has in the past been carried out as a matter of course
under Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court has declared that the authority to make a will is derived from the state, and since the requirement of probate
is but a regulation to make a will effective, probate matters proper are not within the
jurisdiction of federal courts. 37 However, Section 75(r) in no way attempts to confer
on the bankruptcy court power to construe wills or to determine other questions
peculiarly associated with probate jurisdiction. The effect of Section 75(r) is certainly
not to suspend state laws for administration of insolvent decedents' estates as being
"insolvency" laws.38 It does, however, permit a personal representative, by filing a
petition in the bankruptcy court, to cause proceedings in the bankrupcty court to
supersede proceedings in the probate court. The result is the same as that contemplated generally under the Bankruptcy Act; bankruptcy proceedings supersede administration via equity receiverships and general assignments as a matter of course,
and without the permission of the relevant court of adiministration.39 The fact that
the debtor is dead and that his personal representative is an appointed agent of the
state court should not be sufficient to make unconstitutional the supersession in bankruptcy of state court proceedings to administer the insolvent decedent's estate. Even
though the deceased farmer cannot personally benefit from a discharge of his debts or
be personally protected in his farm, the extinction or readjustment of creditor-debtor
relations is sufficient to characterize the proceeding under Section 75(r) as a bankruptcy proceeding.4o The personal representative, whose principal function it is to
pay the decedent's debts and discharge his liabilities, is the proper person to represent
the deceased farmer in the bankruptcy court, notwithstanding the fact that he is appointed by the probate court.
It may well be that some authorization of the personal representative's petition by
the probate court is necessitated by the principle of the Cleary case, at least to the
extent of preventing an encroachment on the strictly probate powers of the states.4"
37

Farre v. O'Brien, igg U.S. 89, iio (i9o5); Byers v. McAuley, '49 U.S. 6o8 (i893);

Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (883).

38 See Effect of National Bankruptcy Act on State Power over Corporate Reorganization,
7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 700 (i94o); Effect of National Bankruptcy Act on State Insolvency

Statutes, 49 Yale L.J.iogo (i94o). Cf. Hawkins v. Learned, 54 N.H. 333 (1874).
39 Ibid.
40 Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648,
673 (1935); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 1i, i86 (19o2).
41 Cf. In re Prudence Co., Inc., 79 F. (2d) 77, 8o (C.C.A. 2d 1935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 646
(r935), where the court said that it would raise serious questions of constitutionality if the
Bankruptcy Act provided that a state superintendent of banks, who had taken possession of
the debtor's property under state law, could file a petition in bankruptcy which would terminate his stewardship and transfer into the custody of the bankruptcy court the property of
which he was possessed. Compare also the requirement of authorization by the state for the
filing of a petition by an irrigation district which is a political subdivision of the state. Ashton
v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936); United States v.
Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). See in general, the Tenth Amendment as a Limitation on the
Powers of Congress, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1939).
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It would seem, however, that Section 75(r) and General Order 50(9), properly construed to respect the limits of bankruptcy jurisdiction on the one hand, and probate
jurisdiction on the other, represent a constitutional exercise of the bankruptcy power.
Federal courts, sitting in equity, have been reluctant to interfere with proceedings in
probate courts because the probate courts are convenient tribunals for such proceedings and the relief afforded by them is generally adequate.42 But the reason for declaring personal representatives to be "farmers" under Section 75(r) seems to have
been that, in the case of deceased farmers' insolvent estates, probate proceedings do not
afford an adequate remedy. The probate court cannot, for example, modify the remedy
of foreclosure provided under state law, in the interest of aiding embarrassed farm
families. If it is a vital part of public policy to prevent the foreclosure of farm mortgages during the farmer's life, it is equally important to do so when foreclosure is
threatened after his death.

Bankruptcy-Section 75(s) of the Bankruptcy Act-Right of Mortgagee to a Foreclosure Sale-[Federal].-A farmer-debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt under Section
75(s) of the Bankruptcy Act.' Later a mortgagee of the debtor petitioned the federal
district court under the second proviso of Section 75(s) (3)for an immediate sale of the
property,2 on the ground that the debtor had no reasonable hope of financial rehabilitation and that he had failed to comply with certain court orders. The debtor by crosspetition, under the first proviso of Section 75(s)(3), sought permission to obtain
the property by paying into court the appraised value.3 The mortgagee contested the
latter petition, arguing that under Section 75(s)(3) its request for a sale took precedence over the debtor's claim to acquire the property by payment of the appraised
value. The district court ordered a public sale upon finding that: (r) the fair value of
the property was $6,ooo; (2) the mortgage debt had increased to $16,ooo; (3)there
was no evidence of the ability of the debtor to refinance himself, even at the $6,ooo
figure. On certiorari from the Supreme Court to review a judgment of the circuit court
of appeals affirming the order, held, that the debtor's request for relief under the first
proviso of Section 75(s)(3) cannot be defeated by a secured creditor's request for a
public sale under the second proviso. Judgment modified and case remanded. Wright
v. Unio, Central Life Ins. Co.4
The first Frazier-Lemke Acts permitted the farmer-debtor who had been adjudicated a bankrupt either to purchase the property at its appraised value immediately after
42Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 503, 509 (t874). See in general, Federal Jurisdiction in
Matters Relating to Probate and Administration, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 462 (1930).
'49 Stat. 943 (1935), 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(S) (1939).
2" . ... upon request in writing by any secured creditor ....
the court shall order the
property ....to be sold at public auction." 49 stat. 943 (1935), ii U.S.C.A. § 203(S)(3)
(1939).
" ....upon request of the debtor the court shall cause a reappraisal of the debtor's
property .... and the debtor shall then pay the value so arrived at into court ....
for distribution to all ....creditors ....and thereupon the court shall ....turn over full possession and title of said property, free and clear of encumbrances to the debtor." 49 Stat. 943
(1935), 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(S)(3) (1939).
4 6r S. Ct. 196 (1940).
s4 8 Stat. 1289 (1934).

